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Article 7

National Sovereignty: Must it be Sacrificed to the
International Criminal Court?*
I. INTRODUCTION

The essence of statehood, of being a country distinct from neighboring lands, is the capacity for self-determination. For centuries, if not
for all of human history, sovereignty has been the core element of differentiation between groups, people, and nations. With the rise of international agreements, and the formation of multinational trading
agreements, countries must face questions concerning national sovereignty that have never been encountered before. Clearly, increased involvement in international agreements and organizations will require
countries to cede more and more sovereignty to international governmental organizations.'
International involvement between nations is not new. 2 The twentieth century, however, has seen an incredible increase in the number
and variety of international organizations, including the failed League
of Nations of the 1920s, other post World War I agreements, and the
United Nations and Bretton Woods agreements following World War
II. The second half of the century has seen a virtual explosion of governmental and non-governmental organizations operating in the world
arena.
Despite the phenomenal growth of international cooperation and
interdependency, the world is increasingly less humane. Conflicts generating Nazi-like atrocities have increased since the end of that regime, 3
as exemplified by ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia, Indonesia, Sierra
Leone, and Kosovo. In light of the increased willingness among some
nations to use such heinous practices, many have concluded that an international tribunal of justice is needed. 4 War crimes trials at the end of
• Copyright@ 1999 by David A. Nill.
1. See Patrick Tangney, The New Internationalism: The Cession of Sovereign Competences
to Supranational Organizations and Constitutional Change in the United States and Germany, 21
YALE J. INT'L L. 395, 397 (1996).
2. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PAC!S LIBRI TRES (William Whewell
trans., 1853).
3. See Daniel J. Brown, Note, The International Criminal Court and Trial in Absentia, 24
BROOK. J. INT'LL. 763 (1999).
4. See New Impetus in Establishment of International Criminal Court, AssA-Irada, Feb.
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the two great wars of the century and the tribunals in operation in
Rwanda and Bosnia are examples of the need of a permanent institution
to those espousing this position. 5 Groups arguing for an international
tribunal of justice were pleased with the acceptance of the International
Criminal Court ("ICC") created by the treaty in Rome in 19986 and
looked for its quick ratification by the national governments. 7
The formation of the ICC opens the door to new and troubling
questions concerning the future of international justice and its influence
on national sovereignty. 8 This paper seeks to examine the rationale,
formation, and current status of the ICC. Further, this paper seeks to
analyze the hazards presented both by the ICC treaty and by the presumptions that underlie it. Section II examines the history and current
status of the ICC. Section III explores several problems that are evident
under the existing format of the ICC. Section IV proposes alternative
solutions to the ICC that will be more respectful of national sovereignty.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The formation of the ICC has been a project long in the making.
Three trends have contributed to the creation of an international justice
system: the evolution of violence, the expansion of the media's coverage, and an increased sensitivity to human rights. These trends are interrelated, each having played a role in the development of the others.
War has evolved from the Nineteenth Century model where armies
avoided civilian populations, to the Twentieth Century pattern of using
any advantage, even the mass killing of civilians, to gain the upper
hand. Along with the evolution of tactics, media awareness of atrocities

15. 1999, available in 1999 WL 10613722.
5. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-jive Years: The
Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. Rrs. J. 11, 11
(1997) ("In the absence of such a court, not only have many atrocities gone unpunished, but every
one of the ad hoc tribunals and investigations that has been created has suffered from the com peting interests of politics or the influence of a changed geopolitical situation.").
6. The Convention for the formation of the ICC was held in Rome on July, 1998, and
produced the Rome Statute, signed by most of the nations in attendance.
7. See John R. Schmertz, Jr. & Mike Meier, By Large Majority, U.N. Conference in
Rome Approves Permanent International Criminal Court, 4 INT'L L. UPDATE 88 (1998) ("On July
17, after a number of stormy sessions, a mostly jubilant U.N. conference in Rome approved the
'Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.' The vote was 120 to 7, with 21 abstentions.
The United States, Israel and China were among those delegations that voted against the Convention .... The Convention will not enter into force until ratified by 60 nations.").
8. See Robert J. Howard, Comment, An Economic Paradigm for the Debate Concerning
the Jurisdictional Extent of the International Criminal Court, 8 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 117, 118
(1998) (allowing personal jurisdiction from an international body creates the largest jurisdiction
ever enjoyed). No wonder nations are nervous about the ICC.
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has also increased. The advent of radio, newsreel film, television, and
the Internet has brought war crimes increasingly to the attention of nations that are at peace. Finally, an increased awareness of human rights
has generated the will and the capacity to create change without regard
to national boundaries. Each of these factors has generated an increased
desire among nations to find a way to deal with atrocities on the international level. The ICC has evolved from that desire, but it remains unclear whether such a tribunal appropriately addresses the rising tide of
human rights abuses and whether individual nations will accept its jurisdiction.

A. A Brief History of International Justice
The history of international justice is fraught with political concerns.9 Following World War I, the Allies formed a tribunal to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II and Turkish leaders for starting the war. 10 The
tribunal's powers included authority to prosecute German and Turkish
military personnel for war crimes. Though charges were brought
against Turkish officials for massive killings of Armenians in 1915, all
were granted amnesty because the treaty on which the charges were
based was never ratified. 11 This occurred in part due to the politics surrounding the rise of Communist Russia. The countries of the Western
World felt they needed an ally in that region, so they rehabilitated Turkey for that role, and past offenses were forgotten.
The commission did not produce much better results in Germany.
The Kaiser evaded prosecution. 12 Of nearly nine hundred individuals
identified as war criminals, only forty-five were submitted to the German court for prosecution, and only twelve officers were ultimately
prosecuted. 13 This emboldened the Nazi generation in Germany. Adolph Hitler, commenting on the lack of consequence for atrocities in
World War I, said, "Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians?" 14 The failure of the World War I tribunals
9. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 12 (international tribunals have always been subject to
"realpolitick goals").
10. See id.
11. See id. at 17. The treaty that was ratified, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, contained no
provisions for prosecution, but did contain a provision granting amnesty. /d.
12. See Bryan F. MacPherson, Building an International Criminal Coun for the 21" Century, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-6 (1998) (the U.S. was opposed to prosecuting the Kaiser on the
grounds that it would violate German sovereignty); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent
International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 668-69 (1996).
13. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 20. Another source puts the total of identified war
criminals at 901. See J. Holmes Armstead, Jr., The International Criminal Court: History, Development and Status, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 745, 746 (1998).
14. Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 21 (quoting JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG:
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sparked proposals for a permanent international criminal court, but in
the face of the Great Depression, nothing developed. 15
World War II tribunals fared somewhat better, but were still the
tools of politicians more interested in global positioning than administering justice. The Nuremberg trials were born in political disunity.
Great Britain desired immediate execution for Hitler and his colleagues
because "their 'guilt was so black' that it was 'beyond the scope of any
judicial process.'" 16 Stalin favored a special international tribunal just
for Hitler, his advisers, and senior military leaders. 17 The United States
and France favored a "tribunal to record history, educate the world,
and serve as a future deterrent. " 18 The trials began under the U.S. and
French plan; however, British concerns that the trials would become a
"forum for propaganda and self-justification" were well founded. 19 The
USSR used the trials to accuse Germany of atrocities committed by
Russian troops. 20 The United States accused Germany of deliberately
encouraging Japan to bomb Pearl Harbor, 21 thus allowing the U.S. to
claim they were victims of German aggression. 22
The trials in Germany were also marked by hassles and delays because the officiating nations had disparate ideas on how to apply their
different notions of justice. Defining the crimes subject to prosecution
added to the problems as well. Finally, the advent of the Cold War left
the West in dire need of a strong Germany, and in need of Nazi talent
to confront the Communist threat. 23 Consequently, the number of trials
decreased, sentences shortened, and many defendants were acquitted. 24
The war crimes tribunals in Japan following World War II suffered

THE POLITlCS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 15
(1982) (quoting Adolf Hitler, Speech to the Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals on the
Obersalzburg (Aug. 22, 1939))).
15. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 7; Wexler, supra note 12, at 668-69.
16. Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 23 (quoting TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS 29 (1992)); see also MacPherson, supra note 12, at 8; Wexler, supra note
12, at 672-73.
17. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 23-24.
18. /d. at 24.
19. /d.
20. See id. (citing J.K. ZAWODNY, DEATH IN THE FOREST: THE STORY OF THE KATYN
FOREST MASSACRE 5 (1962)).
21. See Jeremy Rabkin, Editorial, The Dangers of Indicting Milosevic, WALL ST. J., Apr.
12, 1999, at A22.
22. See id.
23. Or, at least in need of keeping Nazi talent out of the hands of the USSR.
24. Even still, 20,000 individuals were tried with war crimes in the zone tribunals after the
Nuremberg trials. However, of the 24 high Nazi officials indicted, three were acquitted, 12 were
sentenced to death, and the remainder were sentenced to prison terms. See MacPherson, supra
note 12, at 8-9.
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similar problems. Although some individuals were prosecuted and sentenced, the process was inherently unfair and contrary to the rule of
law. 25 Ultimately, with tacit approval from General MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito issued a proclamation of clemency for all that may have
committed crimes during the war in 1946. 26
Despite the mixed results in Germany and Japan, the Allies improved international justice. For example, the trials emphasized the
principle that individuals, regardless of their position in the government, could be tried for violations of international law. 27 This principle
implied that "individuals have international duties which transcend the
national obligation of obedience imposed by the individual state. "28
However, brushed aside in the rush to impose justice was the consideration that this still represented the "victor's justice. " 29
These trials are not adequate models for current situations nor for
the ICC. On the one hand, in both World Wars the international allies
completely conquered the offending nations. The offending leaders
were either dead, in custody, or at least potentially available for incarceration. Additionally, evidence was in the hands of the occupying
forces. Lastly, these were international conflicts where the legal basis
for international prosecution was stronger. On the other hand, Rwanda,
Bosnia, and Kosovo (at present without a presiding tribunal) present
much more complex situations. None of these nations has been overthrown by occupying forces. Therefore, the leaders responsible for the
crimes remain in power or under the protection of the existing government. Evidence gathering is next to impossible when the responsibility
remains in the hands of these governments that are generally hostile to
the work of the tribunals. Finally, the legal basis for international
prosecutorial intervention is more tenuous because these conflicts were
civil wars, rather than international conflicts. Hence, although one may
argue these recent tribunals are direct descendants from Nuremberg,
they are actually very different.
Following World War II the United Nations (UN) was established
and the work towards creating an international tribunal continued. Most

25. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 33.
26. See id. at 34 (quoting R. John Pritchard, The Gift of Clemency Following British War
Crimes Trials in the Far East 1946-47, 7 CRIM. L.F. 15, 24 (1996)).
27. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 9.
28. !d.
29. See id. at 10. In addition, the Jaws applied to the World War II tribunals were frequently ex post facto in nature. See id. ("[The Allies] reasoned that liability may exist under international Jaw even if the offense is not spelled out with the specificity of a penal statute, provided it
is clear that the defendants knew that the conduct was wrong and fundamental principles of justice
are not offended.").

124

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 14

of the effort before 1990 took the form of continuing the codification of
international crimes. 3° Further development in the 1950s and 1960s was
stymied due to disagreement over enforcement, jurisdiction, and other
issues. 31 The growth of international drug trade renewed interest in an
international tribunal in the 1980s, particularly with the plea for assistance from Trinidad and Tobago. 32 The explosion of ethnic and gender
crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda brought the issue to the
forefront of international attention and impelled the UN towards forming an international court. 33 The death of the bipolar Cold War world
freed countries from East/West pressures and concerns and focused
work towards an institution that had been on hold since World War II.
The culmination of these efforts resulted in the treaty agreement of
1998, forming the ICC. The creators hoped that the days when one law
was applied to the victors, and another to the vanquished would end,
and that political pressure would be removed from the court. 34 This
hope appears to be early and unsubstantial.
B. The Desire and Rationale for a Permanent Solution
Clearly, the problems of international tribunals in the past, along
with the worldwide increase in violence, have created the impetus towards a multilateral solution. From World War I to Bosnia and
Rwanda, tribunals have been subjected to national interests and competing types of jurisprudence. Thus, there is a desire for a permanent
system.
A permanent system would eliminate the necessity of establishing ad
hoc tribunals every time the need arises. The decision to establish
such tribunals, not to mention drafting the applicable statutes, takes
considerable time during which the evidence of the crimes becomes
more difficult to obtain, and the political will to prosecute dissipates.
Moreover, a political debate is invariably reopened over the provisions of the statute, who will conduct the prosecutions, and who will
sit in judgment. Such pressures leave ad hoc tribunals vulnerable to

30. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 49-55. Codification of crimes was not without difficulty. For example, the definition of aggression took 20 years to develop, but was never voted
upon in any setting. See id. at 54; Wexler, supra note 12, at 676-77.
31. See Brown, supra note 3, at 767. For an interesting debate from 1952, see John J.
Parker, An International Criminal Court: The Case for its Adoption 38 A.B.A. J. 641 (1952), and
George A. Finch, An International Criminal Court: The Case Against its Adoption, 38 A.B.A. J.
644 (1952).
32. See Brown, supra note 3, at 767.
33. See id.
34. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 49-55.
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political manipulation. 35

Much of the desire for a permanent solution arises from the international abhorrence of the atrocities committed in intra and international conflicts. This abhorrence leads to several policy rationales supportive of an international court. The first rationale is deterrence. Many
people believe that if a permanent court will punish international
crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, such punishment
will deter future potential criminals. 36 While this is a general principle
of criminal justice that is demonstrable at the local level, deterrence becomes more theoretical and less capable of proof at the national and
international level. Nevertheless, supporters of the ICC hold to deterrence as an important rationale. 37 Some people are concerned that the
furtherance of human rights in the world will be stymied as long as
there is no price to be paid for violating those rights. They argue that
"[i]mpunity not only encourages the recurrence of abuses against human dignity, but also strips human rights and humanitarian law of their
deterrent effect. " 38
Creation of a permanent court would remove the accusation that has
dogged the ad hoc tribunals. Critics have attacked each of the previous
attempts at international tribunals as "victor's justice, " 39 in part due to
the lack of universality and specificity in international law. 40 While
some movement has occurred in the UN to standardize and codify international crimes, the structure for the international court has not kept
pace until this decade. 41 Whether, with the signing of the Rome treaty,
the legal structure of the international court is sufficiently in place to
avoid its use as a political tool is yet unclear.
Another rationale for the creation of the ICC is to address serious,

35. /d. at 60-61.
36. But see Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National/merest?: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on /nt'l Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong.
1, 29 (1998) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (testimony of John Bolton, former Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organization Affairs).
37. See Claudio Grossman et a!., International Support for International Criminal Tribunals
and an International Criminal Court, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1413, 1417, 1436 (1998). Senator
Arlen Specter states, "I strongly believe that deterrence is a big factor in life. If you prosecute and
punish people and they know that punishment is a possibility, it will affect their conduct. I believe
that what is going on right now in The Hague is very important as an international precedent and
as a matter of deterrence." /d. at 1417.
38. Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HuM. Rrs. L. REv. 291, 292 (1998).
39. Good examples of victor's justice were the tribunals in Japan after World War II. See
Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 31-37.
40. See Armstead, supra note 13, at 748.
41. See id.
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but heretofore unprosecuted war crimes. 42 For example, the use of rape
as a tool of "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia focused the
world's attention on gender crimes. Upon closer inspection, most of the
wars of the Twentieth Century contain documented evidence of rape as
a tool of conquest and domination. 43 In spite of the documented evidence of rape in Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during World War
II, neither the Nuremberg nor the Tokyo Charter enumerated rape as a
crime against humanity. 44 Rape was not included in "crimes against
humanity" until the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 45 Therefore, the
creation of the ICC afforded the opportunity to codify laws on rape that
previously received only oblique reference in international agreements.46
Fairness in the judicial process is also cited as a reason for the establishment of the ICC. 47 For example, many times tribunals are organized to deal with war crimes solely to punish the vanquished. These
tribunals are, therefore, open to the valid criticism that their purpose is
just to achieve "victor's justice" and that the tribunals are in use only to
exact retribution for the terrors of war. 48 As Justice Murphy said in his
dissent in In re Yamashita, "If we are ever to develop an orderly international community based on a recognition of human dignity, it is of
the utmost importance that the necessary punishment of those guilty of
atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly stigma of revenge and
vindictiveness. " 49 Additionally, some countries' legal systems do not
meet international standards of fairness or due process, even in domes-

42. Recent events in Sierra Leone have avoided the headlines, but are indicative of the
kinds of atrocities the ICC hopes to punish. See David J. Scheffer, Deterrence of War Crimes in
the 21st Century (visited Sept. 23, 1999) < http://www.iccnow.org/htmllscheffer.html >.
43. See Nicole Eva Erb, Comment, Gender-Based Crimes Under the Drafts Statute for the
Permanent International Criminal Court, 29 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 401 (1998) (relating
and citing the rape of Chinese women by Japanese soldiers invading Nanking, Nazi soldiers raping
Jewish and Soviet women, Korean women forced into sexual servitude by the Japanese, several
rapes of Vietnamese women by American troops at the My Lai massacre, Iraqi soldiers raping
women during the invasion of Kuwait, rapes of female supporters of Aristide occurring during the
military coup in Haiti, Hutus raping Tutsis and vice versa in Rwanda, and military officials of all
sides raping targeted ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia).
44. See id. at 408-10 (stating that the Tokyo charter did include rape as a violation of recognized customs and conventions of war).
45. See id. at 410-411.
46. See id. at 407 ("Traditionally, international legal instruments have not explicitly addressed the crime of rape or other gender-based crimes committed in armed conflicts.").
47. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 17.
48. See id. The imposition of a foreign version of justice increases the sense of being
wronged by the process as well. This imposition may increase the sense that such justice is just
further violence. See infra note 172.
49. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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tic cases. 50 The ICC is offered, therefore, as a means of standardizing
justice and supplanting the legal systems of countries that are otherwise
incapable of rendering a fair verdict.
Other reasons supporting the establishment of the ICC include the
ad hoc tribunal's lack of consistency and failure to establish precedent.
Past ad hoc tribunals have been marked by a singular lack of consistency and lack of judicial memory. 51 "From a legal standpoint, ad hoc
tribunals cannot hope to achieve a desired level of consistency in the
interpretation and application of international law because their statutes
are inevitably tailored to meet the demands of the specific situation that
brought them into being. "52
A related concern, in addition to consistency, is whether the political will exists from crisis to crisis to establish a tribunal. 53 Many people
fear that judicial fatigue will set in, resulting in crimes going unpunished. Questions are naturally raised concerning why one conflict deserves a tribunal and another does not. 54 For example, the UN established tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but not for
Iraq, Somalia, or Sudan. If there were a permanent ICC, the will required to begin an investigation into atrocities would not depend upon
the politics of the UN or national leaders.
Another reason favoring the establishment of a permanent court is
that countries rarely punish war criminals on their own. 55 Frequently,
the end of conflict brings a desire to return to normalcy. Additionally,
conflicts often end with a negotiated settlement between the warring
parties. Settlement often includes amnesty as a condition for the cessation of hostilities, freeing otherwise criminally negligent individuals
from prosecution. New governments may also include individuals who
are responsible for war crimes. Such countries are naturally unwilling
to prosecute war criminals. 56 Supporters of the ICC claim that a permanent international institution would have the political distance necessary
to bring these criminals, regardless of their positions, to justice.
A structural argument for the establishment of the ICC also exists.
The creation of a permanent court would be beneficial to the international community because it would help address what some internation50. See id. at 18.
51. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 23. The legal systems of smaller countries may be
intimidated or overwhelmed with the problem of dealing with international criminals. See id.
52. See Pejic, supra note 38, at 293.
53. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 35 (testimony of Michael P. Scharf in support of
the International Criminal Court).
54. See Pejic, supra note 38, at 293.
55. For example, Chile has not prosecuted General Pinochet.
56. See Pejic, supra note 38, at 292.
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alists see as the main failings of the international system of justice, the
lack of a permanent and effective enforcement mechanism. 57 The establishment of a permanent court would enable the international community to enforce the law, hence meeting all the goals. 58 However, many
things must be presumed to reach that conclusion. An international enforcement mechanism would require either vast national cooperation or
some kind of international police force. Neither is likely to be greeted
with much favor by most nations. Therefore, it is presumptuous to see
the ICC as establishing an international law enforcement mechanism.

C. The International Criminal Court Treaty
The International Criminal Court treaty was signed in Rome on July
17, 1998. Delegates met for five weeks before they brought the proposed treaty language into a form upon which a vote could be taken. 59
The vote resulted in 120 delegations voting in favor, seven against, and
twenty-one abstaining. 60 The United States, China, and Israel were
among those voting against the treaty. The primary reasons for their
"no" vote was the broad jurisdiction and the independence of the prosecutor.61
57. See id. at 294.
58. See id. at 328-29.
In the 50 years since the Nuremberg trials, massive human rights and humanitarian law abuses have been committed-and continue to be committed-worldwide. While
the international community finally seems poised to end impunity and strengthen deterrence by creating a permanent International Criminal Court, the outcome of this effort
remains uncertain. Guided primarily by political, rather than legal considerations, states
risk establishing a judicial body that will not be able to fulfill its important tasks. A
permanent International Criminal Court must be independent and effective if it is to
meaningfully strengthen accountability for egregious crimes of concern to the international community. This means that the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction must not be
stymied by political considerations and that the court must be able to effectively prosecute and punish the perpetrators of international crimes once its jurisdiction has been
established. There should be little doubt that the structure set up in Rome will not be
amenable to easy change. All efforts should therefore [sic] made to ensure the creation
of a viable institution that will withstand the test of time. Countless victims of past and
current atrocities deserve no less.

/d.
59. See Brook Sari Moshan, Comment, Women, War, and Words: The Gender Component
in the Permanent International Criminal Court's Definition of Crimes Against Humanity, 22
INT'L L.J. 154, 170 (1998). This author's description of the conference is inaccurate
because it implies the treaty language was developed by the delegates. The delegates actually
worked from the draft prepared by the UN Preparatory Committee.
60. See id. As of April 13, 1999, 81 countries had signed the treaty. See Czech Republic
Signs Statute on International Criminal Court, Czech News Agency, Apr. 13, 1999, available in
1999 WL 15623755 [hereinafter Czech News].
61. See Moshan, supra note 59, at 170-71. In spite of these objections, the U.S. delegation,
as of the Preparatory Commission held in July and August, 1999, seemed willing to sign the treaty
if they could arrange protection from prosecution for U.S. military personnel and others.

FORDHAM
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Ill. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
There are many inherent problems with the International Criminal
Court, some of which are unavoidable. Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have touted the court as an answer to the problems encountered with the ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. These problems include the logistics of transporting witnesses
and defendants and having thousands (in Rwanda) awaiting trial with
little movement towards that end. 62 An ICC seated at The Hague would
solve neither of these problems. The problems of transporting witnesses, defendants and attorneys (not to mention housing and feeding
them) and obtaining passports and visas increase by having the tribunal
outside the country where the crimes were committed.
In addition, there is no resolution in the ICC for a second problem:
many people are accused and there are too few judges. In its current
conception, the court will not have the capacity to operate more than a
few trials at a time. 63 Proponents of the court point to this issue as a
reason to allow future growth in the size of the court. 64 However, it is
difficult to imagine an international court large enough to handle thousands of trials in a timely fashion, as the Rwandan situation would require, and yet remain affordable to the world community.
Currently, a single prosecutor oversees both the Rwandan and Bosnian courts, resulting in the problem of overseeing institutions thousands of miles apart. 65 While having a centralized court will relieve
some of the problems of oversight, 66 it will exacerbate the problems of
discovery in the nations where the crimes occurred. On-site prosecutors
have a difficult time gathering evidence. Adding thousands of miles of
travel will only further complicate the process.
A counter argument to this problem with the ICC might be that the
prosecutor could rely on the legal structure of the countries involved to
provide the "on the scene" assistance, like discovery. This may be
available in some instances, but it flies in the face of one of the original
presumptions of the ICC. The court presumes that after an armed conflict not every country has, or will have, a legal system in place to perform such tasks. Physical distance will still hamper evidence gathering

62. See Brown, supra note 3, at 771; see also Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (Prosecution Response to the Defense for Provisional Release 3.2.5) ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/1-PT (Jan. 14,
1998) (visited Sept. 17, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p288-e.htm> ("The tribunal in
Yugoslavia has indicated that incarceration for 577 days while awaiting trial is reasonable.").
63. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 56.
64. ld.; see also infra Part III. D.
65. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 48.
66. See Brown, supra note 3, at 771-72.
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and discovery where there is no credible legal system in place to do it
for the court. Reliance on local legal systems is also problematic because it depends on their willingness to assist. Discovery is nearly always an adversarial situation. Attempting to use local law enforcement
when it too may be resistant will defeat such efforts completely. The
touted swift justice67 simply will not occur.

A. Intrusion on National Sovereignty
Perhaps the central issue facing the ICC is its effect on sovereignty.
However, most commentators plunge ahead, either tossing the issue
aside as unimportant in the modern world68 or waving it as a standard
that should be held inviolate. 69 In light of the unthinking treatment sovereignty normally receives, consideration of the differing perceptions
will be helpful. It is presumptuous to believe that all members of the
world community accept the same definition of sovereignty as the
United States. Sovereignty for an American, and for any person from a
country based on a similar form of government, devolves from the people, not the state. Other nations perceive sovereignty as a national right
belonging to the government. For nations that accept the latter definition of sovereignty, ceding it to an international entity is less troublesome. However, for individuals and nations that accept the definition of
sovereignty as a power and right emanating from the people, cession to
international entities is very troublesome. John Bolton, former assistant
Secretary of State, described this theoretical divide:
One of the executive branch's strongest powers is the law enforcement power. In the United States we accept this enormous power because we separate it from the adjudicative power and because we render it politically accountable through Presidential elections and
congressional oversight. . . . Europeans may feel comfortable with
the ICC structure, no political accountability and no separation of
powers, but that is a major reason why they are Europeans and we are
not. 70

67. See id. Justice has been anything but swift in Rwanda, where most detainees remain in
prison years after apprehension and without a trial. A member of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) at the July PrepCom for the ICC reported that many of the oldest and
youngest detainees have been released without trial. Apparently, neither the Tribunal nor the
Rwandan government had the funds to continue maintaining the prisoners while awaiting the glacial process of justice.
68. See Grossman et al., supra note 37, at 1438; Tangney, supra note 1, at 397.
69. See Gary T. Dempsey, Reasonable Doubt: The Case Against the Proposed International Criminal Court (July 16, 1998) (visited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa31l.htrnl >.
70. Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 31 (testimony of John Bolton).
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Indeed, in the United States, ceding the "national" sovereignty presents problems that go to the core of the nation's legal structure. Thus,
understanding there the are different perceptions of the meaning of sovereignty helps in appreciating the motivations of both those who signed
and those who refused to sign the treaty. It also aids in recognizing the
perceptions that different nations have of how the ICC will affect them.
The ICC treaty establishes personal jurisdiction over the individuals
in the member states. 71 Necessarily, personal jurisdiction by an international organization raises sovereignty issues. Many proponents of the
ICC minimize the potential intrusions on sovereignty that may occur.
"Sovereignty concerns will have to be addressed; but ... international
law is gradually moving away from a State-centrist approach towards a
more moral, human rights approach. It is imperative that this reality be
recognized in the jurisdiction and the powers of the court. " 72
International law may well be moving away from a state-centered
approach, but that movement is not rapid. The formation of the World
Trade Organization and the number of years required to come to an
agreement in the Uruguay Round of GATT is strong evidence of the
importance nations place on sovereignty. Perhaps more importantly, the
actions of countries in the past decades are even more indicative that
overcoming sovereignty by a single treaty is a mere dream. 73
A crucial test for the ICC will take place over sovereignty. The individual, not the nation, will be subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus posing the question whether nations would "run the risk of having
their nationals sent to be tried by judges possibly from enemy or rogue
nations. " 74 Will nations be willing to see their troops, acting as peacekeepers on foreign soil, come under the criminal jurisdiction of this
court? 75 The answer for many nations, the United States likely included,
will be no. 76 Nations that would cede to the jurisdiction over their citizens would also face the temptation of allowing jurisdiction only when
it suited their political goals. 77 Therefore, the ICC would find coopera-

71. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999,
1003 (1998).
72. Grossman et al., supra note 37, at 1438.
73. See Robert F. Drinan, Is a Permanent Nuremberg on the Horizon?, FLETCHER F.,
Summer/Fall 1999, at 103, 105.
74. Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, FLETCHER F., Summer/Fall1999, at 77, 90.
75. This concern is certainly on the minds of the Clinton administration and the U.S. Senate. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 17-21.
76. See Drinan, supra note 73, at 107 (pointing out that the U.S. might have been deterred
from some of its international interventions had Washington been concerned about individual soldiers, generals, or political leaders being haled before an international court).
77. The Human Rights Watch expresses the concern that nations will avoid jurisdiction by
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tion only when a nation deemed it expedient. The experiences of the
International Court of Justice and the World Court are instructive. Developed nations frequently ignore rulings or refuse to be subject to the
courts when it is in their interest to do so. 78
Even some who espouse the concept of an ICC acknowledge the
problem that sovereignty presents:
States are understandably jealous of their right to investigate and
try international criminals in their own courts. National pride leads
states to have faith in the competency and fairness of their domestic
judicial systems. They do not want to surrender control over criminal
cases to another tribunal. Certainly, with the exception of the core
crimes, states are capable of prosecuting the majority of international
crimes fairly and effectively, and the Statute [for the International
Criminal Court] should encourage national prosecutions when feasible. Moreover, victimized states have incentives to pursue cases that
an international tribunal might lack. 79

This observation implies that, in most situations, nations do not need
(and frequently will not want) the ICC because their legal systems are
capable of handling most of the issues. Historically, nations punished
for their violence dealt with in a punitive way after a violent period
tend to make poor members of the world community. Nations allowed
to resolve their own crimes while receiving different international aid
fare much better. 80
An additional problem that the above quote addresses is the issue of
parity. For example, "[w]hile the United States might take satisfaction
in conducting trials of those who commit war crimes against its military
personnel, that satisfaction would hardly be worth the discomfort of
seeing American servicemen on trial in Baghdad or Tripoli. " 81 Any de-

invoking a "national security" privilege. See Human Rights Watch, Section M: The Protection of
National Security (visited May 5, 1999) <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/icc/jitbwb-15.htm>. It
states, "[National security] must be balanced against other important and potentially competing
interests. These would include the interests of victims, and of the international community as a
whole . . . . Deference to a national security must be tempered by the need to ensure the protection of international security, which is seriously compromised by the commission of heinous
crimes and the impunity that so often surrounds them." /d.
78. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 6 (statement of Senator Jesse Helms) (recalling
the World Court's attempt at exercising jurisdiction over the U.S. for its support of the Nicaraguan
Contras, and the fact that the U.S. ignored the court due to lack of jurisdiction).
79. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 40.
80. For example, compare post WWI Germany with post WWII Germany. Nuremberg may
have had some influence, but with the immediate rise of the Cold War, most of the resolution of
national and individual culpability was left to the Germans. Supporting the thesis of this paper,
Germany's judicial system was rebuilt by the Allies, and has become one of the most credible in
the World.
81. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 42; see also Howard, supra note 8, at 123-24.
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veloped nation would feel similarly. Therefore, the likelihood of having
such investigations by the ICC ignored is high. The U.S. delegation attempted to resolve this at the Rome Conference by preserving the right
of reservation to specific aspects of the treaty. This proposal was
soundly defeated by the rest of the delegates. While there may remain
the option of amending the treaty, some groups are adamantly opposed
to such a thought. They fear that amendments to the ICC, particularly
by powerful nations, would only make it a tool of the UN Security
Council 82 and likely administer only "victor's justice."
The U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference refused to sign the
treaty for a related concern. In its final form, the treaty extended the
court's jurisdiction to situations where only one party of the dispute
came from a signatory member. 83 This amounted to an indirect grant of
jurisdiction over any person involved in the state where the crimes occurred, regardless of whether their nation was subject to the ICC. The
U.S. delegation argued that this would create a situation where
[M]ultinational peacekeeping forces operating in a country that has
joined the treaty can be exposed to the Court's jurisdiction even if the
country of the individual peacekeeper has not joined the treaty. Thus,
the treaty purports to establish an arrangement whereby U.S. armed
forces operating overseas could be conceivably prosecuted by the international court even if the United States has not agreed to be bound
by the treaty. 84

The U.S. delegation sought to amend this section, but were overwhelmingly defeated. 85 Therefore, the treaty signed in Rome may violate national sovereignty by indirectly allowing jurisdiction over nations
that chose not to be a signatory. A logical ramification of this is that
nations will be less inclined to send troops to participate in peacekeeping missions, 86 therefore, diminishing security in some parts of the
world. Primarily for this reason, although the Clinton administration
favored the ICC, the U.S. delegation refused to sign the treaty. 87

82. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 42 (citing Daniel H. Derby, An International
Criminal Court for the Future, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 307, 311 (1995)).
83. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1010-11; Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 12 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer).
84. Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 13 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer).
85. See id. at 12.
86. See id. at 13.
87. See id. at 15-16 ("Our position is clear. Official actions of a non-party state should not
be subject to the Court's jurisdiction if that country does not join the treaty, except by means of
Security Council action under the UN charter. Otherwise the ratification procedure would be
meaningless for governments."). Ambassador Scheffer, in response to queries by the Senate,
stated that de facto universal jurisdiction, and the independence of the prosecutor were two of the
most significant factors leading to his refusal to sign the treaty. See id. For another perspective,
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State cession of sovereignty would cut against both states where the
crimes occur and those states trying the crimes. 88 For example, the state
where the crimes are committed must cede its sovereignty in order for
the court to operate there. In addition, cases may arise where national
courts try individuals extradited from the state where the crimes occurred. The sovereignty of the trying state would also be subject to
abridgement as well, because ICC complementarity is merely a cover
for judicial review. Judicial review occurs when the ICC exercises its
power to review whether a state court is unwilling or unable to prosecute individuals the ICC has determined fall under its jurisdiction. 89 The
ICC, in this way, may become a part of the state legal process90 by reversing or upholding decisions of what were previously courts of last
resort.
Supporters of the ICC have overlooked a singular feature of sovereignty. Senator John Ashcroft, of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, stated, "If there is one critical component of sovereignty, it
is the authority to define crimes and punishment. This court strikes at
the heart of sovereignty by taking this fundamental power away from
individual countries and giving it to international bureaucrats. " 91 Senator Ashcroft, expressing the sovereignty concerns he felt for the United
States, continued,
No aspect of the Court is more troubling, however, than the fact
that it has been framed without apparent respect for-and indeed in
direct contravention of-the United States Constitution ...

The proposed court . . . neither reflects nor guarantees the protections of the Bill of Rights. The administration was right to reject the
Court and must remain steadfast in its refusal to join a court that
stands as a rejection of America's constitutional values. 92

Pierre Sane. the Secretary General of Amnesty International, "expressed his regret that a few
powerful countries appeared willing to hold justice hostage by threatening and bullying other
states, and seemed sometimes to be more concerned to shield possible perpetrators from trial
rather than producing a charter for victims." International Criminal Court-Crippled at Birth?
(visited Mar. 19, 1999) <http://www.hri.ca/urgent/icc-0722.shtrnl>.
88. See Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that
Overcomes Past Objections, 23 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 432 (1995) ("[T]he absolute
doctrine that a state is supreme in its own authority, and need not take into account the affairs of
other nations, is no longer tenable.").
89. See infra Part III.E.
90. See Dempsey, supra note 69.
91. Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 8.
92. /d. at 9. Senator Ashcroft concludes:
In Monday's New York Times, there is an opinion piece in which Anthony Lewis
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A cession of sovereignty that abrogates the fundamental principles
of any country, whether that sovereignty be the ability to define crime
and punishment or the establishment of constitutional principles, is a
cession that cuts too deep. Perhaps the biggest problem with attempting
to sign away such sovereignty is that nations will not abide by it, 93 and
therefore, the credibility of the court will be diminished, rendering it a
toothless institution.

B. Textual Ambiguities and Inadequacies
Criminal law is successful, as well as consistent and fair, when
each crime has elements that must be proven in order to convict a defendant. Not only does the ICC fail to contain specific elements for
crimes, it fails to adequately define the core crimes. For example, the
delegates insisted on including the crime of "aggression" but utterly
failed to define it. 94 Defining aggression has proven to be incredibly
vexing, and there is no clear resolution in sight. 95 The possibility exists
that there will be concurrent and differing definitions of aggression
within the UN architecture, leading to inconsistent and unjust application of international law. For example, the ICC may find itself at odds
with the Security Council over whether aggression has occurred. This
would enmesh the court in the very political thicket the drafters of the

chastises the United States for missing a historic opportunity by failing to vote in favor
of the International Criminal Court. The author states that the vote to form the International Criminal Court "will be seen as a turn in the road of history." That is perhaps
the only point in the piece with which I agree. The approval of this Court was indeed
"a turn in the road of history." By ceding the authority to define and punish crimes,
many nations took an irrevocable step to the loss of national sovereignty and the reality
of global government. I, for one, am heartened to see that the United States took the
right turn on the road of history, and I will work hard to ensure there is no backtracking.
/d. at 10.
93. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 19-20 (questions from Senator Jesse Helms, answers by Ambassador David J. Sheffer). This problem is foreshadowed by the fact that a number
of countries have constitutional prohibitions on extraditing their citizens to any other nation.
Therefore, these countries would have to cede this civil right in order to comply with the ICC statute. See id.
94. See Czech News, supra note 60. Nine months after the Rome Conference, the UN Preparatory Commission is still attempting to resolve this definition. See id.
95. See MacPherson, supra, note 12, at 50.
The United States [delegate] explains the problem:
[l]t is not at all universally established what fits even within the limited concept of
"waging a war of aggression." What are the possible defenses or mitigating factors ...
? What if it concerns a disputed territory? Where there is a conflict that is settled by
reference to the International Court of Justice, for example, does the losing party automatically become guilty of an aggressive war? What about controversial concepts such
as humanitarian intervention or a war of liberation?
/d.
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ICC sought to avoid.%
Elements of crimes and rules of procedure shared a similar fate in
the drafting of the ICC treaty. In the UN Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom) meetings shortly before the Rome conference, the United
States delegation pushed for definition of the elements of three core
crimes: genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The
other states involved argued there was not time to do this and that the
priority should be on agreeing to the crimes covered by the convention.
They also argued that since this was a common law approach, definition
of elements could wait until after the signing of the statute. 97 Since the
conference and signing of the treaty, the PrepCom has made little progress in formulating elements or rules of procedure for the court. 98 As of
March 1999, the Commission had only agreed to a goal of June 30,
2000 to have draft versions of these rules and elements completed. 99
Apparently, its hope is that states will ratify the treaty without knowing
the treaty's final contents. 100 So far only one state, Senegal, has done
so.JOJ
The concerns raised by the United States early in the negotiating
stage about elements to the crimes appear well founded. 102 At the
March 2, 1999, PrepCom meeting, delegates circulated discussion pa-

96. See id. at 49. (MacPherson's solution to the problem is to remove the prerequisite of
having the Security Council determine if such an act has occurred. Also, because the definition of
aggression is so difficult to nail down, it ought to be omitted as a term in the jurisdiction of the
court until it is properly defined). See id. Press commentary on the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia
may be indicative of the potential quagmire ahead of the court in defining aggression. See Czech
News, supra note 60 ("The concept of 'aggression,' which is only mentioned in the current version of the statute, is currently being considered by the Preparatory Commission for the Court set
up by the UN. The results of the negotiations should be interesting in view of the current air attacks on Yugoslavia.").
97. See Christopher Keith Hall, The Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 548, 551 (1998).
98. See UN: Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court concludes first session at HQ, M2 Presswire, Mar. 2, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12607695.
99. See id.
100. The mandate of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, is otherwise. Addressing the
opening of the Preparatory Commission meeting in February 1999, he stated, "[Y]ou have to
elaborate clear and unambiguous rules on the practice of the Court, and on the elements of the
crimes over which it has jurisdiction." Establishing International Criminal Court will be Fitting
way to Inaugurate New Millenium, M2 Presswire, Feb. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL
12605514.
101. Senegal's signing was a move similar to signing a contract before material terms are
settled.
102. Nonetheless, some groups saw U.S. actions as obstructive. Jelena Pejic, a member of
the Lawyers Comminee for Human Rights, stated, "Washington is attempting to redefine the
crime of genocide until it is 'virtually impossible to prosecute."' Betsy Pisik, U.S. Seeks Changes
to Accept International Criminal Court; Wants to Safeguard Troops from Frivolous Lawsuits
Abroad, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at A17, available in 1999 WL 3078969.
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pers that indicated genocide was still a definition in progress. 103 The
Rome treaty stated, '"genocide' means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group. " 104 A
discussion paper at the March PrepCom meeting defined genocide
somewhat differently:
[T]he crime of genocide was the intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Genocide shall also occur if the accused knew or should have known that his or her actions
would destroy a group or the conduct was part of a pattern of similar
conduct directed against that group . . . . Genocide by killing would
occur if the accused killed one or more persons of a group in furtherance of the intent to destroy it. 105

Granted, the discussion paper is a work in process, not intended to
be a final draft. Nevertheless, it is clear in the differences between the
two that adoption and modification of elements may shift the intent of
the treaty. The treaty did not indicate that the killing of one person
would be sufficient to commit genocide. Whether or not delegates
would have signed the treaty with the language of the discussion paper
included is not known. Those believing that the Rome statute is the final word are likely to be disappointed. They are likely to be subject to a
different law than they originally thought.
Definitional ambiguity is also highly problematic because of the
philosophical underpinnings of criminal law.
The interest in ensuring that crimes are carefully defined stems
from the widespread agreement that the court adhere to the principle
of legality. This fundamental principle of justice requires that there
may be no crime or punishment without a preexisting law that prohibits the conduct and sets the penalty (nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine
lege). It reflects the conviction that criminal law is intended to guide
conduct and can do so only if people know in advance what is prohibited. 106

Therefore, the signing of a treaty purporting to adhere to these rule
of law principles, when in fact few of the details are worked out, puts
the credibility of the court into question even before it is formed. For
example, the definition of genocide includes "[i]mposing measures in-

103. The Clinton administration has not been clear on its definition either. See Stephen J.
Morris, Editorial, Clinton's Genocide Confusion, WALL Sr. 1., Jan. 12, 1999, at A22.
104. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1003.
105. UN: Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court concludes first session
at HQ, M2 Presswire, Mar. 2, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12607695.
106. MacPherson, supra note 12, at 51 (footnotes omitted).
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tended to prevent births within the group. " 107 A number of interpretations are possible from this, ranging from Nazi-style forced sterilization
to UN-sponsored birth control programs. 108 The discussion paper from
the March PrepCom meeting does little to clarify: "Genocide by preventing births would occur if the accused imposed measures that were
intended to prevent births within a group. " 109 Unlike the other elements
of genocide referred to in the discussion paper, birth prevention did not
include an intent element. Therefore, it makes no improvement on the
treaty language. In order for the statute to make sense, ambiguities such
as these must be resolved.
Another inherent problem of ambiguity lies beyond the lack of
definition of the elements in that the ICC prosecutor decides when to
investigate based on referrals from any source. 110 He or she need only
convince two of the three judges in the Pre-Trial council to proceed to
prosecution. 111 This means that justicability may differ depending on a
variety of circumstances rather than on a pre-determined policy. If the
bar of justiciability is left too low, or open to broad interpretation, the
Court risks being overrun with cases of little international significance. 112 If the bar is too high, the Court is not credible because serious
crimes go unpunished.

C. Court Politics
If the Rome Convention is any indication, this Court will not escape
the extreme political pressures that characterized its inception. At the
conference, when some delegates from conservative countries discovered language espousing a broad definition of gender, 113 the negotiations intensified substantially. 114 Additionally, some countries became
concerned that the language of the treaty criminalizing enforced pregnancy and enforced motherhood might result in an international challenge to anti-abortion laws. 115 Another attempt was made by some

107. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. supra note 72, at 1003.
108. Even with the intent requirement for genocide this would still be a legitimate claim. An
individual could argue that such a program is intended to reduce the population of a group.
109. UN: Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court concludes first session
at HQ, M2 Presswire, Mar. 2, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12607695.
110. See infra Part III.F.
111. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1022, 1032;
see infra note 160.
112. See Howard, supra note 8, at 121 ("The defining line between a crime against one human, and crimes against humanity in general is, at best, vague.").
113. Some groups pushed for acceptance of language describing five different genders.
114. See Moshan, supra note 59, at 154, 178-79.
115. See id. at 175-76.
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groups to get the delegates to agree on language that would remove the
element of intent as a requirement for gender crimes. These attempts
also became hotly debated issues, resolved by the delegates only in the
final hours of the convention. 116 Proponents of these issues were not
pleased with the outcome and later complained that the statute failed to
protect women. 117
Another dubious political move involved jurisdiction over terrorism
and drug trafficking. 118 The United States and other countries have been
involved for years in the process of formulating the ICC, and had come
to an agreement leaving drug and terrorism crimes outside its jurisdiction. 119 Nevertheless, they discovered on the last day of the Rome conference that a small group of delegates had altered the text of the statute
to include these crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. 120
This would not be the only issue at the Rome conference decided
behind closed doors by a small cadre of representatives. 121 On the last
day of the conference, the treaty contained a stipulation barring states
from taking reservations from portions of the statute that might conflict
with their domestic laws. 122 The U.S. delegation had expected the treaty
to include a right of reservation and was displeased at the last minute
alteration. 123
The United States was not the only country subject to political maneuvering. Israel chose not to sign the treaty because the article describing war crimes would have criminalized the settlements on the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. 124 Further, at a PrepCom meeting on the

116. See id. at 178 n.152. The definition of gender was narrowed to "male and female" as a
concession to Islamic states agreeing to the "inclusion of rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual slavery." Not all women's groups were pleased with this result. See id.
117. See id. at 178.
118. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 14 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer).
119. The U.S. feared the court would interfere with existing drug and terrorism interdiction
programs and agencies in a detrimental way.
120. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 14 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer).
121. See id. at 15; David J. Scheffer, America's Stake in Peace, Security, and Justice (visited Mar. 19, 1999) <http://www .state.gov/www/policy _remark1998/980831_scheffer_icc.
html>.
122. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 15 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer).
123. Another concern the U.S. delegation expressed was that "the judges [selected would]
not be confined to those from democratic countries with rule of law. The judges [would] be elected
by a super majority of the state parties. Given that, the group of 77 developing countries in the
U.N. General Assembly, which routinely vote against the United States and which is really more
like 160 countries, could represent such a majority." See id. at 3 (opening statement of Senator
Rod Grams) (expressing concern that ICC judges would be drawn disproportionately from countries unfriendly to the U.S. and from court systems vastly different from the U.S.).
124. See Marilyn Henry, 'Palestine' Seeks Recognition on New International Criminal
Court, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 28, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9000054; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1007 (stating that the direct or indirect transfer of
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elements of crime, Israel objected to the Arab States' draft proposal
giving a Palestinian state UN recognition. 125 Alan Baker, head of the
Israeli delegation, declared, "The UN by definition is a political organization, so even when you are getting together to produce a statute
for an international criminal court, which should not be something political, you inevitably get politically motivated activities." 126
Perhaps political pressures are inherent in a convention seeking to
produce a treaty. 127 However, a process that includes last minute
changes not subject to the negotiation process does not bode well for
the entity under creation. Such actions diminish the sense of ownership
and loyalty that negotiators might otherwise feel towards the agreement
because the pact then includes a position that could not have won on its
own merits.
Another example of the political pressure on the ICC is evident in
the attempts to alter terms of the treaty after signing. Some groups,
seeing the current version as best representing their interests, oppose
any alteration at all. 128 The U.S. delegation, however, has made it clear
that "key aspects of the treaty must be changed or the United States will
actively work against it." 129 The U.S. is not the only force seeking
changes in the trf'aty. Even among signatories, efforts are afoot to alter
it. For example, in the first session of the PrepCom to establish rules of
procedure and evidence, the French delegation introduced a proposal
not fully in harmony with the text of the treaty. While stating that the
"statute was a package that was completely supported by France," their
proposal "did not digress profoundly" from it. 130

the population of an occupying nation into the occupied territory is a war crime); Worldsources
Online, Overcoming Reticence on International Criminal Court, WORLD TIMES, May 5, 1999.
available in 1999 WL 15653415 [hereinafter Worldsources Online]. The U.S. Senate also expressed concern over this issue. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 23-25 (acknowledging that
Israel would be exposed to liability under the ICC Statute).
125. See Henry, supra note 124.
126. /d.
127. See Worldsources Online, supra note 124. Other numerous political moves at Rome
included India's attempt to include the use of weapons of mass destruction as a crime. See id.
Upon having this motion voted down, the Indian delegation complained, "The message this sends
is that . . . the international community has decided that the use of nuclear weapons is not a
crime." /d. Sri Lanka and Turkey abstained from the vote because terrorism was not included as a
crime. See /d. China agreed with the U.S. that universal jurisdiction on core crimes and the power
of the prosecutor were too broad, and voted against the treaty. See /d. Singapore abstained, objecting to the last minute changes worked behind closed doors by a small number of delegations,
and objecting to other issues. See /d.
128. Richard Dicker, legal advocate with Human Rights Watch, stated, "Protocol aimed at
fixing what the United States objects to in this treaty could unravel this complex document." Pisik,
supra note 102.
129. /d.
130. UN: Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court begins first session, M2
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Perhaps some departures are necessary to transform a treaty into a
working document. Nevertheless, political pressure to alter the nature
and scope of the ICC is omnipresent. Nations and interest groups, opposing the ICC, have applied substantial political pressure to date. It is
foolish to believe that such pressure will diminish once the court is fully
established. The treaty keeps the door to politics ajar by allowing an
elective procedure on various court issues by member states in the future. While oversight and control by the member states is necessary to
maintain some semblance of a consensus-based organization, the opportunity to employ political pressure on the court in the future is troubling. It places political jockeying ahead of judicial distance. Due to its
immersion in ongoing international politics, the credibility of the court
will always be in danger. 131

D. Mission Creep: Can the ICC Refrain From Expanding?
The Rome Treaty intends to create a court to handle world war
crimes on the rationale that the ICC will deter would-be perpetrators. 132
However, by providing for substantial future growth in the treaty, supporters appear to disbelieve that result. Senator Rod Grams, chairman
of the Senate Subcommittee on International Operations, stated:
Supporters of this treaty are banking on the fact that the United
States will allow this court to flourish and gain legitimacy over time.
We must not allow that to happen. Even if it is weak at its inception,
the Court's scope and its power can and will grow. This court will be
an international institution without checks or balances, accountable to
no states or institution for its actions, and there will be no way to appeal its decisions except through the Court itself. 133

The Senator's concerns are well founded. Proponents of the court
pushed for the Rome treaty signing without having elements or rules of
procedure in place. The crime of "aggression," according to the negotiators, need not be defined until at least seven years after ratification. 134
Presswire, Feb. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12605515.
131. For example, the political hazards of bringing Slobodan Milosevic to justice present just
such a minefield. See Rabkin, supra note 21.
132. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
BRIEFING SERIES, VOL. 2 No. 3 (1999) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITTEE]; but see Dempsey,
supra note 69 (" [T]here is no evidence that holding war crimes trials reduces the number of threats
to international peace and security. If anything, the opposite is true: making war less atrocious
makes it more likely.") (quoting Alfred P. Rubin, Dayton, Bosnia and the Limits of Law, 46
NAT'L INTEREST 44 (Winter 1996-97)).
133. Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 3 (opening statement of Senator Rod Grams).
134. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1004, 1067. It
should be noted that negotiations on the definition of "aggression" have proceeded informally
during the PrepComs in 1999. Further, Phillipe Kirsch, Chairman of the PrepComs, announced in
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The presumption of a growing jurisdiction, not only in territory, but
also in types of crimes as well, is evident throughout the statute and in
the statements of its supporters. For example, it is not sufficient for the
court to address only a narrow class of international crimes. Some see
the court as ultimately "act[ing] as a standard setting mechanism in the
interpretation and application of international law and provid[ing] a
model for national authorities in the administration of criminal justice. " 135 Placing the ICC as the interpreter of international criminal law
dramatically exceeds the scope and intent of the Rome Statute. Nevertheless, if the court is successful, it may serve such a purpose. However, to hope that it will provide a model for national administration of
criminal law implies a role all nations would find offensive because it
implies they are incapable of developing a legitimate legal system.
While some developing nations may look to the ICC to model their
criminal code, most developed nations would resist such a model in favor of their system already in use. It is conceivable that reformers
would seek to leverage change in their national judicial systems through
seeking to expand the influence of the ICC into the domestic sphere. An
obvious area where this would likely occur is capital punishment. If the
ICC were to become the model of criminal justice, nations continuing
to impose capital punishment would come under increasing pressure to
alter their laws to conform to the international standard. Indeed, minority interests (including individual defendants with creative defense attorneys) could seek to use the ICC standard to overcome majority chosen positions in criminal law.
A troubling presumption of the proponents of the ICC is that institutional durability requires the ability to grow. 136 Their concern is that
the world will use the court so infrequently that it will be incapable of
garnering respect.
The real threat to the court's stature is the prospect that it will be little
used. If the international court is to command respect, it must have
sufficient jurisdiction to play a real role in the struggle against interAugust that beginning in the November/December PrepCom, aggression would receive full treatment with formal and informal working groups meeting to discuss the definition.
135. LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 132.
136. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 56. MacPherson uses the United States Supreme
Court as an example of how a court with a flexible size and description can well serve its constituent nation. See id. His antecedent complaint is the inability of the Court to try more than two cases
concurrently. See id. The author seems to want to argue for the ability to expand the number of
judges on the Court as need arose. See id. Using the U.S. Supreme Court as a desirable example
of flexibility does not support this position. The U.S. solution to increasing case load has not been
to increase the number of judges on the Supreme Court, rather, the Court has been given power to
decline review, and does so in the vast majority of cases. This model would likely be rejected for
an international court.
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national crime. There is no danger that the court will be trivialized as
long as it is making a valuable contribution to criminal justice. 137
Hence, the presumption of the ICC's supporters is that it will be used
and expanded as necessary into the future. This presumption is troubling for two reasons. First, if respect for an institution depends on usage, then those in the institution will see that it succeeds. It is the nature
of any organization to justify its existence. Second, this position argues
against the premise of deterrence. If the court is a successful deterrent,
it cannot grow without expanding the list of crimes under its jurisdiction.
Mission Creep is also evident in the rhetoric of those urging that
the court's jurisdiction should not be limited to specific crimes. 138 Allowing the court to try crimes outside the list of most heinous international crimes will further intrude upon state sovereignty. Consequently,
the role of national judicial systems will be further eroded. Also, hearing any case containing an international or transnational element that
exceeds the current scope of court jurisdiction, will create precedent
that could expand the role of the court beyond its treaty.

E. Determination of Justice
The purpose of a court is to determine what is just between a plaintiff and a defendant. The ICC complicates this process by claiming concurrent, or complementary, jurisdiction over some crimes. The stated
ICC goal of complementarity 139 is troubling because it appears to be
unworkable. According to the treaty, the ICC will share jurisdiction
over the named crimes with the national court system, only stepping in
when the national system is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution. " 140 Article 17 of the Rome statute lays
out the factors to determine unwillingness:
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the court
shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court . . . ;
137.
138.
139.
140.

/d. at 46.
See id. at 48.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1002-03.
See id. at 1012.
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(b) There has been an unjustifiable delay in the proceedings . . .
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person ... to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in
a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person ... to justice. 141

Article 17 also includes the elements for determining inability on
the part of the national courts: "The court shall consider whether, due
to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial
system, the state is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings." 142 Therefore, although the stated goal of the court is to complement national court systems, the treaty clearly outlines processes for
judicial review of national court decisions. 143
There are, however, three problems with allowing the ICC to review national court action. First, the statute provides no standard for
judging its own terms. How long a delay in a national court will the
ICC consider unjustifiable? Will it look to the national court system, or
other UN court actions like the international tribunals in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda? 144 When will the ICC deem a national court
too partial or dependent? The statute is silent on these issues.
The second prong of the problem with judicial review is that it may
create another level of appeal for defendants before national courts. A
national decision on a case having international parties, falling within or
near the jurisdiction of the ICC, might produce an appeal by the losing
party. The problem with such a scenario is that it exposes complementarity to be a sham. 145 If individuals are capable of appealing out of the
court of last resort of their nation to the ICC, then the ICC will enjoy
de facto judicial review. Such review will result in the imposition of
ICC legal theory upon the national court systems.
A final troubling concern over de facto judicial review is that the
statute would require judicial investigations to avoid ICC review. For
example,

141. !d.
142. !d.
143. But see Human Rights Watch, Section E: Complementarity (visited May 5, 1999)
<http://www .hrw .org/reports98/icc/jitbwb-07 .htm > .
144. One wonders, given the lengthy incarcerations of suspects in Rwanda by the international tribunal, whether that court would not be considered "unwilling" under the Rome Statute.
145. See Dempsey, supra note 69 (positing that complementarity means the ICC could not
overcome the verdict of a national trial or legislation, therefore the ICC would have to exercise
judicial review to achieve its ends).
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[I]f an ICC prosecutor wanted to investigate and charge the President
of the United States for a bombing raid like the one President Reagan
conducted in Libya, our only way to prevent the case from going forward would be to have our own Justice Department investigate the
President. If the U.S. Government then declined to prosecute, it
would still be up to the judgment of the ICC whether to prosecute and
pursue the case. 146
Such an outcome is another example of the incredibly intrusive nature of the ICC statute. 147 The prosecutor's ability to initiate an investigation based on a referral from NGOs, becomes the power to force
such actions within a nation. This imposition will be unpalatable to any
nation so coerced.

F. The Vast Authority of the Prosecutor
The Rome Statute grants broad powers to the prosecutor's office of
the ICC. 148 For example, the prosecutor may investigate alleged crimes
based on the referral of the UN Security Council, state parties, victims,
NGOs, or any other reliable source. 149 The prosecutor determines the
reliability of the source, as "he or she deems appropriate. " 150 Some
groups tout the ability to obtain referrals from non-state sources
(NGOs, victims, etc.) as a most important victory because they feared
states would be unwilling to refer situations to the court. 151 While states
or the UN Security Council may indeed be less willing to refer situations to the prosecutor at times, it is transparently obvious that some
groups will refer situations frequently. This may result in an inundation
of referrals from some groups or individuals.
A hazard in allowing NGOs to refer is that the political leanings of
the prosecutor may become involved in the decision to investigate.
Hence, the propensity of the prosecutor to agree or disagree with the
group may determine the furtherance of the investigation. A prosecutor
may investigate, or refuse to investigate, dependent on her ideological
kinship with the referring group; the prosecutor might see the investi-

146. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 2 (opening statement of Senator Rod Grams).
147. See Rabkin, supra note 21. It may be just as difficult to prosecute Slobodan Milosevic
for the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. See id.
148. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 26-28 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer) (acknowledging the powers and limitations of the office of prosecutor). Prosecutors with any
semblance of independence are currently disfavored in the U.S. See Rabkin, supra note 21.
149. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at lOll.
150. See id.
151. See Human Rights Watch, Sum"Ulry of the Key Provisions of the ICC Statute (visited
May 5, 1999) <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/icc/icc-statute.htm> [hereinafter Key Provisions of the ICC Statue].
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gation as an opportunity to further or stymie a political goal depending
on the source of the referral. 152
The United States and several other nations felt this power was too
broad. This feeling formed one of the reasons for not signing the treaty.
Senator Rod Grams articulated this concern in a hearing before the
U.S. Senate: "[T]he [ICC] prosecutor will have the power to initiate
prosecutions without a referral from the Security Council or state parties. There will be no effective screen against politically motivated
prosecutions from being brought forward. " 153 Ambassador Scheffer
suggested that there existed a legitimate reason for referrals to come
from member states or the Security Council. He made the following
statement:
The value of having a government refer it or the Security Council
refer it is they are accountable to somebody. They are accountable
either to their people, their populace, for doing so, or the Security
Council is accountable to the United Nations system. We believe that
that fundamental principle of accountability should be at the core of
referrals to this court. 154

The Pre-Trial Chamber of the court has the power to deny the furtherance of an investigation by the prosecutor. 155 Nevertheless, the
prosecutor has the power to investigate situations with no oversight before she must submit it to the Pre-Trial Chamber. 156 In addition, she
may return with a new request based on new evidence regarding the
same situation. 157 Therefore, a persistent prosecutor, backed by groups
or individuals, may pursue a particular individual or group she believes
responsible for a crime until the Pre-Trial Chamber allows the investigation to proceed towards court action. Also, even with the Pre-trial
Council, decisions to prosecute can be made by three persons. For international crimes of the magnitude this court is designed to deal with,
three seems to be a small number. 158
Proponents of the court claim that the power of the prosecutor is
quite limited. However, outside of having to meet some requirements

152. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 23 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer).
153. See id. at 3 (opening statement of Senator Rod Grams).
154. !d. at 23.
155. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1011.
156. See id. at 999. This includes the power to go to the site of a crime, talk independently
to witnesses and collect evidence. See id. When national authorities are investigating, the prosecutor may still be present, and may still take voluntary testimony outside of the national investigators presence. See id.
157. Seeid. at 1011.
158. This process is further evidence of the immense power of the ICC judges and prosecutor.
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before investigating within a state, 159 the limitations they cite are dubious at best. The limitations they point to arise in Article 53 of the treaty
and consist mainly of a set of factors the prosecutor should consider before pursuing an investigation. Article 53 states:
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available
to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that
there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this statute. In determining whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:
(a) The information available ... provides a reasonable basis to
believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been
or is being committed;
(b) The case is . . . admissible under article 17; and
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interest
of the victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. 160

These discretionary considerations amount to limitations addressing
only whether a crime has been committed, whether jurisdiction exists,
admissibility of evidence, and other potential overriding political concerns. These reservations are minimal. The statute contains qualifications that allow the prosecutor to have great leeway in initiating investigations. For example, "reasonable basis" is a low bar to investigation.
Therefore, the discretion of the prosecutor is quite broad, 161 extending
to all aspects of evidence gathering, taking of oral and written testimony, and so forth. 162 One of the greatest concerns expressed by nonsigning nations is the prosecutor's power to initiate an investigation
without supervision of any kind. Nothing in the treaty appears to limit
this power.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Something must be done on the international level to address the
159. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 27 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer)
(indicating tbat tbe prosecutor must work cooperatively witb national authorities, and that he or
she does not have ready access throughout tbe world).
160. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1028. The remainder of Article 53 spells out tbe Prosecutor's duties if he or she chooses not to continue tbe investigation, and tbe Pre-Trial Council's power of review of such a decision. See id.
161. See supra Part III. F.
162. Claims tbat the prosecutor's power is limited are questionable. For example, tbe Human Rights Watch lists tbe Pre-Trial Council's power to review a decision NOT to investigate as
tbe main limitation. See Key Provisions of the ICC Statute, supra note 151. Review of a decision
not to prosecute in no way limits decisions to prosecute. See id.
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problem of atrocities and war crimes. Jose A vala Lasso, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights stated that it is an "obscenity" that "a
person stands a better chance of being tried and judged for killing one
human being than for killing 100,000. " 163 Such a record is intolerable.
If the ICC is untenable because of its effects on state sovereignty, what
should the international community do? Several ideas are worthy of
consideration.
With the end of Apartheid and the election of Nelson Mandela,
South Africa seemed poised to commence the process of tribunals to
address past crimes. Instead, South Africa opted for a more conciliatory
approach. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established to
address human rights abuses during Apartheid. The commission has
emphasized gathering information over assigning guilt, and has even
extended pardons for individuals who cooperate. It is not clear what the
result will be, nor is it clear that this would be the best approach to replace the ICC. Nevertheless, it is an alternative worth considering. 164
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission's approach to international
situations may allow for speedier national and ethnic healing, though it
may not fully address the retributive feelings of the victims. The problem with such an approach, in addition to lacking an element of punishment, is that it requires a stable, credible government to operate it.
Additionally, internationalists would worry that the actions of such a
commission would become a sham to protect the guilty. 165
Another alternative to the ICC would be to continue with the ad hoc
tribunals similar to those operating in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The ability to address issues on a case-by-case basis would offer
greater flexibility to the tribunals, and allow international intervention
to bring perpetrators to justice. Presumptively, there would be less concern of "victor's justice" because of the international involvement. The
court could minimize transportation and evidence-gathering costs by
operating in the country where the crimes occurred, rather than at a
distance. The tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have not
been problem free. Those favoring, as well as those opposing the ICC
cite these tribunals to support their positions. It may be, however, that
if the ad hoc tribunal approach had time to ripen as an international
process, it would prove to be a successful and efficient way of dealing
with the core crimes of the ICC statute.

163. Wexler, supra note 12, at 711 (quoting International Criminal Tribuna/for the Former
Yugoslavia Bulletin, No. 8, 10-VII-1996, at 1).
164. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 51 (prepared statement of John R. Bolton).
165. See id. at 51-52 (pointing out that there may be some instances where a full public airing of past misdeeds would be more harmful than helpful).
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Perhaps the best alternative to the ICC that would help preserve
national sovereignty while addressing the pertinent crimes, would be to
allow states to handle such prosecutions domestically. 166 The United
Nations involvement in this regard would be to help developing countries create judicial systems that are credible within the scope of national law. The UN could accomplish this by establishing international
judicial standards palatable to both civil and common law traditions,
and offering aid in the form of funds and expert consultants to assist
countries in the development of their judicial systems. With a solid judiciary in place, nations could deal with the human rights crimes that
might occur. Some may wonder how national tribunals would deal with
individual perpetrators at high levels of government, and argue this is
precisely the reason an ICC is needed. However, if the national justice
system could not address such individuals, the political process certainly could. Therefore, with international guidance to help stabilize
national legal and political systems, nations could handle their own human rights abuses. 167
Perhaps the greatest lesson of international intervention has been
this: until local populations and governments are ready and capable of
dealing with their problems on their own, the problems remain unresolved regardless of the number of peacekeepers and foreign aid. It
may be that John Bolton is right when he said, "[t]o create an international tribunal for the task [of rendering justice] implies immaturity on
the part of [the nations] and paternalism on the part of the international
community. Repeated interventions by global powers are no substitute
for [the nation] coming to terms with themselves. " 168
Given the imperialistic past (and present) of the developed world,
international intervention in the form of ad hoc tribunals or of an international criminal court may be perceived as the imperialism of the new
millenium. 169 States already rail at the orientation of the legal philosophy of the ICC. When fully implemented, some may rightly fear that
once again, the wealthy industrialized world will impose its values on
developing nations. 170
166. Perhaps one way to support domestic prosecution is to work towards an international
treaty on extradition that would require signers to release criminals responsible for international
crimes to national jurisdictions seeking them. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 20.
167. Handling these issues on a national basis would also serve the purpose of leaving national legal philosophies intact, without imposing a foreign notion of justice on a nation.
168. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 52 (prepared statement of John R. Bolton).
169. See, e.g., Rabkin, supra note 21 ("Somebody might even get into [Slobodan
Milosevic's] head that Serbs too, can demand 'justice' for attacks on civilian targets designed to
terrorize people into submission.").
170. For an alternative view on resolving international crime, see Carrie Gustafson, Comment, International Criminal Courts: Some Dissident Views on the Continuation of War by Penal
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V. CONCLUSION

Finally, the ICC fails to address the problem that it identifies. Justice is an attempt to set things right, after the crime has been committed. The genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass rapes have been committed long before the judicial process can begin. By the time evidence
has been gathered and suspects apprehended, the value of the judicial
remedy begins to degrade, particularly when dealing with crimes on a
massive scale. Ultimately, life incarceration remains unlikely for the
chief perpetrators if historical precedent means anything. 171 Therefore,
any deterrent value that the establishment of the ICC might have is
likely only to persuade nations sending peacekeeping troops to think
twice before doing so.
The international community appropriately desires the end to
crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and aggression. The
experience of generations has been that punishment, while important, is
at best a poor remedy for the victims. The victim's greatest desire is to
avoid victimization in the first place. Therefore, the best solutions to
today's humanitarian crises lie not in adjudication that is too late for the
traumatized victims, but in prevention. Perhaps Carrie Gustafson is
right, and justice such as is envisioned by the ICC should be abandoned
because it only perpetuates violence. 172 Perhaps adherence to the tenets
of the world's greatest moral and ethical philosophers would provide a
better solution to both international crime and punishment. 173 Prevention, whatever its form, of war and criminal activity may be as difficult
to achieve as effective punishment provided for by the ICC. The ICC
statute and the premises underlying it are unacceptable, primarily because of the unprecedented erosion it would work on state sovereignty.
Finding a means to prevent crime renders the court unnecessary, and
therefore, prevention is the more laudable international goal.

David A. Nil!

Means, 21 Hous. J. INT'LL. 51 (1998).
171. See id. Though the Rome Statute states that all individuals, regardless of position, are
equally liable to investigation and prosecution, state cooperation will not be equally available depending on the position and popularity of the suspect. See id. Therefore, state leaders will remain
much less likely to be prosecuted than lower level functionaries. See id. This is true even of national leaders considered to be perpetrators. See id.
172. See Gustafson, supra note 170. Incarceration as penology forms the basis of the ICC,
and it is this type of penology that Gustafson avers perpetuates violence. See id.
173. See id.

